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Abstract
Background: Influenza causes annual epidemics and often results in extensive outbreaks in closed communities. To
minimize transmission, a range of interventions have been suggested. For these to be effective, an accurate and timely
diagnosis of influenza is required. This is confirmed by a positive laboratory test result in an individual whose symptoms are
consistent with a predefined clinical case definition. However, the utility of these clinical case definitions and laboratory
testing in mass gathering outbreaks remains unknown.
Methods and Results: An influenza outbreak was identified during World Youth Day 2008 in Sydney. From the data
collected on pilgrims presenting to a single clinic, a Markov model was developed and validated against the actual epidemic
curve. Simulations were performed to examine the utility of different clinical case definitions and laboratory testing
strategies for containment of influenza outbreaks. Clinical case definitions were found to have the greatest impact on
averting further cases with no added benefit when combined with any laboratory test. Although nucleic acid testing (NAT)
demonstrated higher utility than indirect immunofluorescence antigen or on-site point-of-care testing, this effect was lost
when laboratory NAT turnaround times was included. The main benefit of laboratory confirmation was limited to
identification of true influenza cases amenable to interventions such as antiviral therapy.
Conclusions: Continuous re-evaluation of case definitions and laboratory testing strategies are essential for effective
management of influenza outbreaks during mass gatherings.
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Introduction
Seasonal influenza is a contagious, acute febrile respiratory illness
which causes annual global epidemics and is associated with significant
morbidity andmortality. This seasonal activityoften resultsin extensive
outbreaks following introduction into closed communities such as aged
care facilities, schools, cruise ships or military barracks [1,2,3]. These
outbreaks can be associated with significant consequences especially in
aged care facilities. A range of interventions has been suggested to
minimize transmission such as social distancing, improved hygiene,
mass vaccination and antiviral treatment/prophylaxis [4].
The effectiveness of these interventions is reliant on the accurate
and timely diagnosis of influenza. The first component is
identifying individuals who require laboratory testing to confirm
the clinical diagnosis. This occurs when an individual’s symptoms
are consistent with a predefined clinical case definition. The utility
of the applied case definition (i.e. sensitivity) is influenced by
various factors including the age distribution of affected popula-
tions and the location of an outbreak [5,6,7,8].
Following identification of an influenza-like illness (ILI) case,
laboratory testing is generally employed to confirm the clinical
diagnosis. The specific laboratory test chosen depends on several
factors including accuracy, turn-around-time (TAT), availability,
cost and phase of the outbreak. During the early and/or pre-
outbreak stages, laboratory testing aimed at surveillance and
influenza case identification are required thus highly sensitive
nucleic acid tests (NAT) and virus isolation are usually preferred.
In contrast, when laboratory testing is used during the contain-
ment phase, the TAT of testing becomes the most important
consideration to maximize benefits with point-of-care antigen tests
(POCT) or NAT testing fulfilling this role.
Unlike data from closed community, data from clusters of ILI
outbreaks during mass gatherings, such as religious celebrations
and large community events, are seldom collected [9]. Therefore,
no consensus exists on the optimal ILI case definition to assist in
the containment of mass gatherings outbreaks [10]. Similarly, the
relative utility of different laboratory testing strategies during a
mass gathering outbreaks have not been studied.
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instituted by Pope John Paul II in 1986 which is held in different
locations every 2–3 years. In 2008, WYD was held in Sydney,
Australia, from the 15 to 20 of July (http://www.wyd2008.org).
WYD festivities commenced with cultural exchange events
between different Dioceses across Australia. Following this
pilgrims converged on Sydney for WYD celebrations which
officially commenced on the 15
th July [11]. An estimated 223,000
pilgrims from 170 different countries attended a series of mass
gatherings culminating in the Papal Mass on July 20.
During WYD, outbreaks of ILI due to influenza A and influenza
B viruses amongst pilgrims were identified. Using prospectively
collected data, modeling allowed us to explore the impact of
various clinical case definitions and laboratory testing strategies in
the containment of influenza during mass gatherings, and to offer
new insights into epidemic testing strategies.
Materials and Methods
Accommodation during WYD
Approximately 100,000 pilgrims requested accommodation
from WYD organizers and were assigned to specific venues across
metropolitan Sydney [11]. These served as ‘‘home’’ bases with
pilgrims traveling during the day to attend the various large
outdoor religious gatherings with other pilgrims. Venues included
school halls, dormitories, and covered sporting arenas. The largest
venue was the Sydney Olympic Park Site (SOPS) (location of the
Olympic Games in 2000); housing anywhere between 6000 and
12000 pilgrims each night. Pilgrims were allocated floor space and
slept on temporary floor mats with access to shared toilets and
other facilities. Pilgrims were able to take up residency 3 days prior
to the official WYD opening and had to vacate 3 days following
the final Papal Mass.
WYD Influenza Outbreak
An influenza outbreak was first detected and confirmed at one
of the alternate accommodation venue. The SOPS clinic was
promptly established on the 16
th July following identification of
pilgrims with symptoms consistent with an ILI. The SOPS clinic
was closed on the 23
rd July following closure of the SOPS as an
accommodation venue.
The subsequently obtained epidemic curve (Figure 1) identifies
the date of onset of symptoms from all pilgrims presenting the
SOPS clinic.
Intervention
Pilgrims confirmed as positive for influenza by on-site POCT
were prescribed oseltamivir and were voluntarily quarantined with
other symptomatic pilgrims separate from the other pilgrims. For
the first 48 hours, symptomatic pilgrims were requested to stay on
site and not go to the mass events.
Data collection
Data was prospectively collected on all pilgrims presenting to
the SOPS influenza clinic and included demographics, symptoms
and body temperature at presentation. Nasal and throat swabs
were obtained for laboratory testing. Initial testing was performed
by the on-site clinic staff using a point-of-care test (Quickvue A &
BH, Quidel Corp., San Diego, CA, USA). Additional nasal swabs
were taken and sent to a virology reference laboratory for antigen
detection using an indirect fluorescent antibody (IFA) test
(Chemicon, International, Inc, Temecula, CA, USA). All positive
Figure 1. The epidemic curve, as of symptom onset date, from the SOPS clinic. Presenting pilgrims are represented as influenza test
positive or negative and not tested.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006620.g001
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(MDCK) cell lines with cultured viral identification confirmed by
IFA. Following the outbreak, virus detection was conducted on all
samples by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) targeting the matrix
region of the influenza virus genome [12,13]. Testing was
performed on the stored respiratory specimen aliquots (at
280uC) following nucleic acid extraction with a commercial assay
(RocheH High Pure, Mannheim, Germany).
Performance of diagnostic techniques and influenza-like
illness case definitions
The laboratory ‘‘gold standard’’ was defined as either isolation
of influenza virus by culture and/or detection of virus by PCR.
The performance of IFA and POCT were assessed against the
‘‘gold standard’’ with PCR sensitivity calculated against viral
culture alone. Similarly, the performance sensitivities of the SOPS
Outbreak case definition (a history of fever and cough), and
various published case definitions were calculated. The published
case definitions examined included the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) seasonal surveillance influenza case definition
(temperature $37.8uC, a cough or sore throat) [14] and the New
South Wales Department of Health (NSW) influenza case
definition (temperature .38uC, a cough and one other ILI
symptom) [15]. In addition, an optimal ILI case definition with
maximal sensitivity was formulated based on our data.
Model
The impact of the various clinical case definitions, with or
without a laboratory test, was examined in a Markov chain model
constructed using TreeAge Professsional Software (version 1.5.2,
TreeAge Pro, Williamstown, MA, USA) [16]. An individual’s
infection course (Figure 2) was represented as a sequence of
transitions between seven mutually exclusive health states, based
on transition probabilities according to published evidence and
observations calculated from the recorded WYD influenza
outbreak (Table 1). Of the seven possible states, 3 were considered
transient (Not-Infected-Asymptomatic, Not-Infected-Symptomatic and In-
fected-Symptomatic-Not-Isolated), with the remaining four being
terminal (Infected-Asymptomatic, Symptomatic-Isolated-Flu, Symptomatic-
Not-Isolated-Flu and Symptomatic-Isolated-No-Flu). Thus, based on the
probability of fulfilling the case definition and/or returning a
positive laboratory test result, a symptomatic individual with
influenza (Infected-Symptomatic-Not-Isolated) was then either isolated
(Symptomatic-Isolated-Flu) or remains infected but not isolated
(Symptomatic-Not-Isolated-Flu). If not isolated, these individuals were
able to infect further susceptible (Not-Infected-Asymptomatic) individ-
uals.
Model assumptions
Influenza characteristics adopted in the model were based on
previously published observations [17,18,19,20,21,22] (Table 2).
These include: (1) an incubation period of 48 hours following
exposure; (2) the infectivity of an influenza case remained constant
over an entire infectious period of 96 hours after which the
individual was considered fully immune; (3) Two thirds of
individuals with influenza develop symptoms (i.e. a symptomatic
illness); (4) The remaining one third of individuals continued to be
asymptomatic; and (5) asymptomatic influenza cases were half as
infectious as a symptomatic influenza case.
Other assumptions were adopted to maximize the utility of
clinical case definitions and/or laboratory testing with 1) All
symptomatic cases presenting to the clinic on the first day of
symptoms. 2) All cases were isolated (100%) when an individual’s
symptoms met the case definition and/or had a positive test result.
An exception was for simulations where TAT for PCR results were
included, infected individuals continued exposing asymptomatic
individuals pending the PCR result (i.e. after 6, 12, 18 or 24 hours)
followed by a 100% isolation rate.
A minimum and maximum attack rates were estimated using
data obtained from the outbreak and from these data the model
starting prevalence was established. Subsequent probability of
being exposed to an influenza case (exposure probability) was
calculated and equals the number of exposed pilgrims divided by
the total susceptible population (i.e. the total population excluding
all pilgrims previously infected and thus regarded as immune, and
those currently infected with influenza). The experimental
epicurve was compared with the observed epicurve and from
this, the reproduction rate (R0: the expected number of secondary
cases occurring from one infected individual) was estimated [23].
Simulations
Simulations were performed on a set of 6,000 influenza naı ¨ve
(non-immune) individuals for 17 equal one-day increments.
Seventeen days was selected as this i) corresponded to exhaustion
of the outbreak when no intervention is undertaken ii) was
inclusive of the total duration of outbreak observed and iii) was
similar to the expected duration of other mass events [8]. An initial
population size of 6,000 was used as this reflected the core
population at the SOPS. Further simulations were performed on a
population of 12,000 (the upper limit of the number of pilgrim
accommodated at the SOPS), 50,000, 100,000, 223,000 (the total
number of pilgrims attending WYD), 500,000 and one million
individuals. The number of symptomatic cases at the start of each
experiment remained the same irrespective of the population size.
Ethics Statement
The outbreak was an acute public health problem requiring a
rapid response, thus a formal submission for ethics approval was
not undertaken. Both data collection and respiratory tract
sampling was performed as standard of care. All presenting
pilgrims gave verbal consent for both the data collection and
respiratory tract sampling. Written consent was not deemed
necessary as presentation to the clinic was totally voluntary and
involved standard medical practice. The clinical data was
subsequently de-identified for analysis.
Figure 2. Seven state Markov diagram. Each day of an outbreak a
hypothetical cohort of pilgrims moves (following the arrows) to another
or returns to the same health state based on transition probabilities.
Shaded boxes represent terminal (or absorbing) states.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006620.g002
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Performance of case definitions and laboratory tests
Of the 242 patients who presented to the SOPS clinic with ILI
symptoms, 114 (47%) underwent diagnostic sampling of which 45
(45/114; 41%) were positive for influenza. Symptoms were present
for a mean of 3 days (range 0–15 days) with coryza the most
common symptom present (32/45; 71%). Fever at time of
presentation was present in the minority of patients (14/45;
31%) (Table 1).
The performance of the various published case definitions
against the laboratory ‘‘gold standard’’, was suboptimal with the
CDC influenza surveillance and NSW case definitions demon-
strating sensitivities of 40% and 26% respectively. The SOPS
Outbreak case used during the WYD outbreak had a sensitivity of
66%. The presence of coryza (with or without any other symptom)
Table 1. Demographics, ILI symptoms and performance of case definitions and laboratory tests for 242 pilgrims presenting to the
Olympic Park Site influenza clinic.
Number of pilgrims screened 242
Sex, male 90 (37%)
Age in years, mean (range) 26 (12–66)
Mean duration of symptoms in days (range) 3 (0–15)
Prior influenza vaccination 24 (10%)
Pilgrims undergoing respiratory sampling 114 (47%)
Pilgrims positive for influenza 45 (19%)
Symptoms in pilgrims positive for influenza:
Temperature .38uC 14 (31%)
History of fever 30 (66%)
Cough 31 (69%)
Sore Throat 31 (69%)
Coryza 32 (71%)
Number of influenza positive pilgrims meeting a case definition
*
NSW: Presence of a temperature .38uC, a cough and one other ILIsymptom 12 (26%)
CDC: Presence of temperature .37.8uC, a cough or sore throat 18 (40%)
Outbreak Case definition (history of fever and cough) 30 (66%)
Presence of coryza with or without any other symptom 32 (71%)
Performance of laboratory Testing
{
PCR 42 (93%)
1
Indirect Fluorescent Antibody 33 (74%)
1
On-site Point-of-Care 26 (56%)
1
*Case definition outbreak values were subsequently used in the Markov model and are similar to previous published case definition ranges of between 44 and 87%
[28,29,30,31,32].
{The ‘‘gold standard’’ was defined as isolation of influenza virus by culture and/or detection of virus by PCR
1The calculated laboratory testing values were subsequently used in the Markov model and are similar to published PCR, IFA and POCT sensitivities of 90 to 100%
[13,33,34,35]; 60 to 100% [12,36,37] and 50 to 95% [38,39,40] respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006620.t001
Table 2. Baseline probability values and ranges (%) of variables used to construct the Markov model.
Adopted Influenza characteristics Model value Published ranges and references
Influenza incubation period 48 hrs 24–96 hrs [17,18,19,20]
Infectious period 96 hrs 24–144 hrs [17,18,19,20]
Probability of a symptomatic infection 0.67 0.67 [17,24,41]
Probability of an asymptomatic infection 0.33 0.33 [17,24,41]
An asymptomatic infection is half as infectious as a symptomatic infection
1/2
1/2 [17,24,41]
Number of secondary influenza cases from an index case (Ro) 4.0 1.2–20 [21,22]
Exposure probability
# 0.001–1.0 ,0.001–1.0 [42]
*The sensitivity of the case definition or laboratory test is based on the observed influenza outbreak compared to the ‘‘gold standard’’ (see text for details) and
corresponds with value used in the Model simulations.
#The number of exposed pilgrims on a particular day divided by the total susceptible population. In turn, the susceptible population is the total population excluding
all pilgrims previously infected (and so regarded as immune) and those currently infected with influenza.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006620.t002
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sensitivity of IFA and on-site POCT was 74% and 56%
respectively with PCR only 93% (42/45) sensitive as 3 samples
were PCR negative but influenza culture positive (Table 1).
Development and validation of the model
As all presenting pilgrims were not tested, a minimum and
maximum attack rate was estimated. The minimum attack rate
assumed that all non-tested pilgrims, were not infected (45/242;
19%). The maximum attack rate assumed that all non-tested
pilgrims were infected (173/242; 71%). The likely attack rate
assumed that the proportion of non-tested pilgrims was the same
as those tested (95/242; 39%). Fourteen patients’ symptoms
started on the 10
th of July, of which, only 2 of 4 tested had
influenza. Using the above calculated attack rates, the number of
expected cases with symptoms on this day ranged between 2 and 9
cases. The model estimated prevalence was assumed to be 0.1%
(6/6000) and was applied to all simulations.
Utilizing the SOPS Outbreak case definition followed by a
POCT result, model simulations were performed to validate
adopted influenza characteristics against the observed and likely
epidemic curves. Likewise, the optimal Ro was established
(Figure 3).
Subsequent simulations were performed on a hypothetical
population of 6,000 naı ¨ve individuals using a Ro of 4.
Model Simulations
In this model, isolation of patients based on a hypothetically
100% sensitive clinical case definition alone would result in 5% of
the total population being infected by the end of 17 days. A
reduction in case definition sensitivity corresponds with an
increase in the number of infected individuals. When using
coryza, the CDC or NSW case definitions, 12%, 29% and 51% of
the total population would be infected with influenza at the end of
17 days, respectively. To avert greater than 50% of influenza cases
at 17 days compared to no intervention, a case definition threshold
of 27% was required (Figure 4). No case definition was able to
terminate the outbreak.
As no laboratory test can be 100% sensitive, the infection control
strategy guided by a combination of a case definition and any
laboratory test will result in a greater proportion of the total
population being infected with influenza at the end of 17 days
compared to isolation of individuals using a case definition alone. In
combination with a hypothetical 100% sensitive clinical case
definition isolating individuals based on an immediate PCR result
translated in an additional 2% of the total population being infected
with influenza at the end of 17 days compared to isolating on
symptomsalone. Thisincreasedto an additional 4%and10%when
isolation resulted from the combination of a 100% sensitive case
definition and the less sensitive tests of an IFA or on-site POCT
respectively.Similarly,foranycombinationofacasedefinition(with
a sensitivity .20%) an immediate PCR testing would result in the
least number of additional cases compared to IFA or POCT
(Figure 4)with the maximaldifferencebetweenthetestsoccurringat
case definition sensitivities between 20% and 60%.
When PCR TATs were included in the model an increase in the
total number of influenza cases resulted with increasing TATs (i.e.
6 to 24 hours). At day 17, a PCR with a TAT of 24 hours averted
the same number cases compared to an on-site POCT (Figure 5).
Similarly, an IFA test was equivalent to a PCR test with a 12 hour
TAT. These associations remained stable, provided that clinical
case definitions were above 20%.
Despite the apparent differences between the performance of
laboratory tests at day 17, only small differences in delaying the
Figure 3. Determination of the model Ro from the SOPS epidemic curve. The number of observed and likely daily influenza cases (based on
a pilgrims reported symptom onset date) at the SOPS clinic compared to the number of daily cases when decisions are made on the combination of
the SOPS Outbreak case definition and a POCT result and using different Ro values. The likely epidemic curve represents the observed cases and the
additional cases that would have resulted if all individuals presenting were tested. The Ro values are modeled on a closed population of 242 (the
number of pilgrims presenting to the SOPS clinic) and 6000 (the minimum number of pilgrims accommodated at the SOPS).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006620.g003
WYD08 Influenza Outbreak
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 September 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 9 | e6620Figure 4. The impact of case definition sensitivities and a laboratory test on the number of influenza cases averted. The proportion of
influenza cases averted at 17 days compared to no intervention, when isolation of influenza cases is based on increasing case definition sensitivities
alone or in combination with a laboratory test.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006620.g004
Figure 5. The impact of PCR TAT on the number of influenza cases averted. The percentage of influenza cases averted at day 17 based on
PCR TAT in combination with either the presence of coryza or the CDC case definition compared to no intervention. The dotted lines represent the
percentage of cases averted for the combination of the presence of coryza or the CDC case definition and a POCT. (With isolation of patients only
after the receipt of a positive PCR result).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006620.g005
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was achieved. A PCR with a 6 hour TAT would only result in
extending the epidemic for an additional 1 or 2 days compared to
a 12 hour PCR or an on-site POCT respectively, provided that
the case definition sensitivity was above an 80% threshold
(Figure 6).
The major difference between the laboratory testing strategies is
in the number of influenza cases potentially identified and thus
amenable to an intervention. It also enables an intervention to be
delivered to a smaller proportion of those meeting the case
definition. In addition, antiviral prophylaxis would be more
appropriately assigned to ‘‘true’’ contacts. PCR based laboratory
confirmation allowed the isolation of the greatest proportion of
symptomatic cases (Figure 7). For any case definition the number
of symptomatic cases isolated was equivalent for all PCR TATs.
With increasing case definition sensitivity, a larger proportion of
symptomatic cases were isolated irrespective of laboratory test.
The effect of increasing the susceptible population (12000 to 1
million) using the most sensitive case definition (presence of coryza)
with the addition of a laboratory test at day 17 was examined. The
relative impact of clinical case definitions with or without the
addition of laboratory testing remained unchanged irrespective of
the size of the population. In addition, the impact of a PCR with a
TAT of 24 hours was equivalent to an on-site POCT in the
number of averted cases irrespective of population size.
Simulations using differing influenza characteristics revealed
that the R0 had the biggest impact on the total number of infected
individuals at the end of 17 days. With decreasing R0 values, the
number of cases averted by any clinical case definition and
laboratory test decreased. With R0 values greater than 4, no
discernable differences between any case definition with the
addition of any testing modality could be found. The associations
between on-site POCT and PCR delayed by 24 hours remained at
lower R0 values. Similarly, no difference was observed if the
estimated prevalence was altered based on minimum and
maximum attack rates in the untested population.
Discussion
A decision tree analysis was undertaken to review the impact of
different ILI case definitions and different laboratory testing
methods on a larger outbreak, as might occur with other mass
gatherings or during the very early phases of a pandemic. This was
based on data prospectively collected from an outbreak of human
influenza during WYD in 2008.
From our model simulations, the greatest number of ILI cases
could be averted when isolation of individuals during an outbreak
is based solely on a clinical case definition. Nevertheless, no case
definition threshold (including a hypothetical 100% sensitive case
definition) was found that would result in termination of the
outbreak as recognition of asymptomatic infectious influenza cases
remains problematic. Thus, the net impact of any case definition
depends on its ability to delay the peak of the outbreak and to
obtain more time for mobilization of alternative disease control
strategies such as vaccination or antiviral prophylaxis. However, in
our setting, if any of the previous published clinical case definitions
were used, only a minimal (#2 days) extension of the outbreak
would have occurred. The ‘‘optimal’’ case definition (the presence
of coryza) would extend the modeled outbreak by 8 days. Whether
such a high case definition sensitivity can be achieved, especially in
the early phases of an outbreak where symptomatology is
uncertain and potentially variable in the different age groups,
remains uncertain [6,7].
The addition of a laboratory tests to any case definition would
result in a greater number of influenza cases detected at day 17
compared to isolating patients based on symptoms alone, as no
Figure 6. The value of different laboratory tests in extending an influenza outbreak. The number of additional days the outbreak is
extended using a combination of a laboratory test and case definition compared to no intervention. IFA and PCR with a TAT of 24 hours were
equivalent to the PCR with a 12 hour TAT and the POCT respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006620.g006
WYD08 Influenza Outbreak
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 September 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 9 | e6620laboratory test has a 100% sensitivity. This effectively reduces the
clinical case definition sensitivity by between 10% and 20% which
in turn results in an increase in the proportion of infected
individuals and a reduction in the number of additional outbreak
days. In the ideal scenario of a 100% sensitive clinical case
definition, PCR would have the highest utility in preventing
further influenza cases. However, this is reliant on the PCR result
being available immediately, a situation rarely achievable in
clinical practice when factors such as specimen transportation and
laboratory processing are taken into account. This was demon-
strated during the WYD outbreak, where the greatest delay was
due to specimen transportation to the laboratory. Even with an
efficient courier system, it is likely that NAT would require a
minimum of 6 to 12 hours for completion. With extended TATs,
the utility of PCR is reduced, such that 12 and 24 hour PCR
TATs are equivalent to IFA and on-site POCT respectively in
terms the number of influenza cases averted.
What then is the utility of the various laboratory testing
modalities? A laboratory test not only excludes falsely identified
influenza cases due to a poorly specific case definition but also
identifies true influenza cases who are suitable for an intervention,
such as isolation or use of antiviral treatment. Therefore, use of a
laboratory test is a balance between an increase in number of cases
and the number requiring an intervention. The effectiveness of the
subsequent intervention is in turn directly related to testing TAT
and thus immediate less sensitive tests may have greater utility (on-
site POCT) than highly sensitive but delayed tests (PCR with 12–
24 hour TAT).
Changing the influenza attack rate significantly impacted on the
ability of testing algorithms to ameliorate the epidemic. Most
published models of an influenza pandemic used relatively low
attack rates (Ro,3) [4,19,24,25]. Although, our attack rate (Ro
4.0) may seem high, much larger attack rates (Ro 7.5–10.6) in
closed communities have been documented [22] including an Ro
of 20 in a boarding house outbreak during the 1918 influenza
pandemic [21]. Despite these concerns it was evident from our
simulations that for any specific Ro value, the clinical case
definition remains the most influential factor in the number of
cases averted. Similarly, delayed PCR results (24 hours) and on-
site POC testing remain equivalent in their performance.
Although our outbreak may not mirror an influenza pandemic,
similar strategies using the same influenza characteristics have
been applied to predict the behavior of the pandemic
[4,14,22,26,27]. Furthermore, the principles used for determining
the best laboratory and/or case definition is linked to the stage of
the pandemic with highly sensitive rapid testing recommended in
Australia (e.g. NAT) for the DELAY and CONTAIN stages [27].
This requires building laboratory surge capacity with reagent
stockpiling, infrastructure acquisition and staff training. Logistics
of specimen transportation laboratory processing and result
reporting must also be addressed [26]. Our results suggest that
this may not be an effective or appropriate strategy. In addition,
decisions based solely on the combination of an individual’s
symptoms and laboratory tests (i.e. the absence of any other
disease control strategy) would result in the relentless spread of the
pandemic.
Our analysis has several potential limitations. Some of
assumptions used in our model were based on published
epidemiological studies. The heterogeneity of published evidence
reflects different clinical case definitions, sample sizes, timing of
sample collection, transmissibility of different influenza strains, the
incidence of influenza and local healthcare practices including
influenza vaccination. Also, our estimates could be affected by a
publication bias as most studies originate from developed countries
and may not be applicable to all populations. The model is
constrained by a static population in contrast to the dynamic
nature of pilgrims’ movements to and from the various
accommodation venues. This may affect not only the exposure
Figure 7. The role of laboratory testing in detecting true influenza cases. The percentage of influenza cases identified at day 17 based on
the combination of a case definition and laboratory test compared to no intervention.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006620.g007
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vaccination or history of prior influenza infections were not
included in the model and could similarly affect infection
dynamics and exposure probabilities across the different simula-
tions. This may have altered the magnitude of our findings but
would not affect the overall associations or direction of our
conclusions. Interventions in the model (i.e. isolation of individ-
uals) were solely dependent on meeting the clinical case definitions
and/or positive laboratory test results. This is often not the case
during outbreaks as decisions are frequently multi-factorial (i.e
based on known epidemiological linkages and the available
resources). In addition, factors for these decisions tend to change
over time because of varying disease patterns and logistics of
managing large numbers of localized cases. Finally, the closure of
the on-site clinic corresponded with the closure of the SOPS as an
accommodation venue with further cases of influenza certainly
occurring in pilgrims. It remains unknown whether these possible
additional cases would have altered the performance of the various
tests and/or case definitions. Symptoms such as myalgia and/or
fatigue were not captured and may likewise have altered test
performance if included. Despite all these limitations, the aim of
our decision-analytic experiments was to improve the quality of
decisions made in the face of uncertainty and incomplete
information. As our model closely reflected the actual WYD
2008 outbreak data, it is likely that our assumptions are valid and
that our findings can be generalized to larger outbreaks.
In conclusion, the impact of ILI case definitions and laboratory
testing strategies modeled on data from the WYD 2008 outbreak
demonstrated the critical role of specific clinical case definitions
and the limited utility of additional laboratory interventions in
containment of influenza during mass gatherings, seasonal
epidemic and possibly pandemic influenza. Social distancing
strategies guided by highly sensitive case definitions and
epidemiological data are more likely to limit the spread of
influenza during mass gatherings. Cost-benefit analyses of
laboratory diagnostic strategies for influenza are required along
with continuous re-evaluation of case definitions and testing
strategies during both seasonal and mass gathering influenza
outbreaks.
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